85. I agree with the request of non-profit trade associations to clarify that transport suppliers may apply appropriate standards to requests for confidentiality agreements prior to the publication of information. In particular, we provide clarification as unprofitable trade associations wish to use the Commission`s CEII rules as a valuation model for companies requesting network model information and assumptions (before signing a confidentiality agreement), they can do so.  163. See Duke Energy Fla., LLC, 165 FERC 61.230, on P 22 (2018) („The Commission`s precedent is clear that the costs in an LGIA are simply estimates and that interconnecting customers are responsible for paying the actual costs of connection equipment and network upgrades“). 50. Cf. S. Cal. Edison Co., 141 FERC ¶ 61.100, P 23 (2012) („A transmission provider seeking a case-by-case deviation from a pro forma interconnection agreement bears to justify the load and explain what makes the interconnection unique and what are the operational concerns or other reasons for these changes.“); See also PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 111 FERC ¶ 61.098, for P 9 (2005). 275.
Id. at 13-15. SPG raises the same issues regarding the interim interconnection service. 267. In particular, in the context of the pro-forma-LGIA of Regulation No 2003, an interconnection customer provides only prior financing for network modernisations enabling an interconnection service. After the interconnection customer enters the commercial operation, the transmission operator reimburses the interconnection customer through transmission service credits and, over time, integrates the costs of network levels into its debits. Order number 2003, 104 FERC ¶ 61.103 pp 693-96. See also LGIA Art. 11.4.1 („The interconnection customer shall be entitled to a cash refund equal to the total amount, which has been paid to the transmission provider and, where applicable, to the relevant system operator for network upgrades, including all gross or other tax payments that are not reimbursed to the interconnection customer in accordance with Article 5.17.8 or otherwise, and which are reimbursed to the Interconnection customer on a dollar-by-dollar basis for the non-use-sensitive customer: Part of the transfer rights are payable, as payments are made according to the tariff of the transport provider and the tariff of the system concerned for transport services in respect of the large production facility“). 138. We highlight that, by definition, excess interconnection services are only available up to the level that can be accommodated without the need for further network upgrades.
We agree that an excess interconnection service customer may have significantly different electrical characteristics (e.g. .B. short-circuit message, error rate, oscillation profile) than the original interconnection client, and that these differences can sometimes lead to the need to take measures up to and including the construction of new network upgrades to maintain reliable system operation to meet the new excess interconnection demand. The same could be the situation where the total energy inputs of initial and excess interconnection customers are limited to the level of interconnection power contractually agreed by the original interconnection customer. . . .