Finally, Frank McDonough`s study examines British foreign policy and appeasement in British politics and society in the interwar years. Its stated aim is to „show why politics has provoked such passion and opposition.“ (McDonough 1998, 8) It assesses both the causes and effects of appeasement on British society. Andrew David Stedman`s 2011 book Alternative to Appeasement: Neville Chamberlain and Hitler`s Germany examines Chamberlain`s particular circumstances at the time of the agreement. It seeks a global synthesis to analyze the origins, nature and viability of the different alternatives to appeasement. (Stedman 2011, viii) This document contributes to the literature by briefly summarizing the reasons why appeasement was chosen as a response to the 1938 threat and its application to a threat today. The intelligence analyst (and hopefully the policy maker) should apply the lessons learned correctly. Munich was a disaster because it was exactly the opposite of what it wanted to accomplish. The agreement set a dangerous precedent by showing that Britain and France would accept the annexation of small European states in the interest of the continent`s stability. He encouraged Hitler in his desire to subjugate Europe and it can be shown that Stalin saw Munich as an encouraging sign that his own annexation of Czechoslovakia to the Soviet bloc would not provoke conflicts after the war. Instead of preventing aggressive expansionism as expected, the Munich agreement made it more likely in the long run.
During the Second World War, British Prime Minister Churchill, who opposed the agreement when it was signed, decided not to abide by the terms of the post-war agreement and to bring the Sudetenland back to post-war Czechoslovakia. On August 5, 1942, Foreign Minister Anthony Eden sent the following note to Jan Masaryk: On 22 September, Chamberlain, who wanted to go to Bad Godesberg just before his plane to Germany for further talks, told the press who met him there: „My destination is peace in Europe, I hope this journey is the way to that peace.“  Chamberlain came to Cologne, where he received a big reception with a German band that played „God Save the King“ and Germans who offered flowers and gifts to Chamberlain.  Chamberlain had calculated that full acceptance of the German annexation of all Sudetenland without reduction would force Hitler to accept the agreement.  When Hitler heard, he replied, „Does this mean that the Allies have accepted the transfer of the Sudetenland to Germany?“, Chamberlain replied „Exactly,“ to which Hitler replied by shaking his head, saying that the Allies` offer was insufficient. He told Chamberlain that he wanted Czechoslovakia to be completely dissolved and its territories redistributed to Germany, Poland and Hungary, and told Chamberlain to take them or leave them.  Chamberlain was upset by this statement.  Hitler added to Chamberlain that the assassination of Germans since his last meeting, 15 Czechoslovakia, of which Hitler was part of the assassination of Germans, made the situation unbearable for Germany.  In the short term, such a strike would stop Iran`s nuclear program, provided it is successful (a great if).
In the long run, however, the argument for military action is now much weaker than it was in 1938. An agreement was reached on 29 September and.m on 30 September 1938, Adolf Hitler, Neville Chamberlain, Benito Mussolini and Edouard Daladier signed the Munich Agreement. The agreement was officially put in place by Mussolini, while the Italian plan was almost identical to Godesberg`s proposal: the German army was to complete the occupation of the Sudetenland by 10 October and an international commission should decide the future of other controversial territories. In the face of tensions between the Germans and the Czechoslovakian government, on 15 September 1938, Benes secretly proposed to cede 6,000 square kilometres to Czechoslovakia in Germany, in exchange for a German accession agreement of 1.5 to 2.0 million South Germans that expelled Czechoslovakia.