The use by the Council of trademarks, registered or otherwise registered of third parties is subject to the directives, procedures and guidelines established and approved by the owners of such trademarks, as well as to the applicable law or as stipulated in a separate applicable agreement between the Council and such third party. Nov. 52 6 tr. to 120 (piles); see also id. at 137 (Fromm) („[T]here should beed augmente scrutiny when there. . a significant difference in retrocedation or non-claim in forward-looking licenses. »). Assertus latin, participation from asser and ad – + serere to membership – plus series On the other hand, agencies can see that a situation like „Royalty Stacking“, generated by several Reach Through licensing agreements, does not raise problems in terms of cartels, even if it may hinder innovation. In some cases, to innovate, develop or commercialize a new product, licenses are legitimately required for several patents, each requiring the payment of a royalty. However, assuming that this is not anti-competitive behaviour and that the patents at issue are legitimate, the mere fact that the cumulative cost of licences could hinder innovation is not a matter of cartels.
In this context, antitrust laws allow a single intellectual property owner with desirable intellectual property to obtain as much return as the market will bear for the exploitation of that property. (112) 17. id. to 125 (Farrell) (stating that a non-assertion clause is essentially „free permission to use the other`s IP“). 49. Cf. z.B id. at 128-29 (rule) (according to which the same efficiency gains are linked to non-assertion clauses). 20. In view of these advantages and as a precondition for the implementation of a standard, the licensee hereby enters into the following obligation not to assert: 42.
See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Discourage Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 Science 698, 699 (1998); Jane Nielsen, Reach-Through Rights in Biomedical Patent Licensing: A Comparative Analysis of Their Anticompetitive Reach, 32 Fed. L. Rev. 169, 170-71, 176 (2004); see also Part IV (discussion of Reach Through licensing agreements). . . .